Analysis:
Proposal one would lead to higher spending and higher taxes
The
proposed constitutional amendment that would radically alter New
York's budget process will lead to “less fiscal discipline,
higher spending and higher taxes,” according to a new analysis
by the Empire Center for New York State Policy.
The
analysis, by the director of the Manhattan Institute’s Empire
Center E.J. McMahon, explains that Proposal One, the constitutional
amendment, guarantees a late budget because of the contingency budget
the amendment would put in place.
“Proponents
of this change argue that the contingency budget represents an unpleasant
option that no governor or legislator would want to live with for
very long,” the analysis says. “But in the proposed
constitutional amendment, the Legislature gave itself a huge escape
clause: the power to amend the contingency budget twice, with a
single “multiple appropriation bill” and a supplemental
appropriation bill- neither of which would originate with the governor.”
The
amendment would also kill the governor’s budget once the deadline
is passed because it stipulates that the contingency budget “shall
constitute. . .final action” on the governor’s bills,
the analysis says. “Indeed, it flatly prohibits the Legislature
from acting on the governor’s bills after a new fiscal year
begins.”
By
waiting until the deadline is passed the leaders in both houses
of the Legislature put themselves in a position to design a budget
with their own spending items, the analysis says. “For all
intents and purposes, the Governor would then be on the outside
of the budget process looking in.”
The
analysis also points out that the “final action” provision
of the amendment would grant legislators another favor “it
effectively repeals the law withholding legislators’ pay in
the absence of a new adopted budget.”
“The
ability to kill all of a governor’s proposals merely through
inaction—and to get paid for it nonetheless—is an enormous
new incentive for legislators to delay action on the final budget,”
the analysis says. And late budgets are the problem the amendment
is designed to halt.
Proponents
of the amendment point to the two-year school aid appropriations
as an important, and necessary, feature of budget reform, the analysis
says. “However, appropriating school aid two years at a time
will deprive the Governor of significant negotiating leverage and
is likely to result in significantly higher school aid spending.”
The
analysis says that the amendment is so “sloppily drafted”
that it is unclear whether the two-year appropriation would actually
be constitutional in the state even if the amendment is passed “since
the change is not actually authorized under the constitutional amendment
that comprises Proposal One.”
The
analysis also says that Medicaid costs could escalate even further
if the amendment were passed.
“Proposal One would make it possible for either house of the
Legislature to single-handedly kill Medicaid reforms sought by a
governor,” the analysis says. “Moreover, the broad federal
spending exception to the contingency budget limitations arguably
could put all or most state Medicaid spending on permanent autopilot,
beyond the reach of the governor’s vetoes.”
“Given
the Legislature’s spending proclivities and aversion to any
form of sunshine, Proposal One is a prescription for even looser
fiscal practices in state government—the last thing New York
needs.”
The
analysis said that real budget reform would include a requirement
for a balanced budget, among other items.
“Most
discussion of state budget reform has focused on the budget process
without much consideration of improving results,” the analysis
said. To improve results the state’s constitution should be
amended to cap the annual growth in state funds spending at the
rate of inflation plus population growth and put new limits on state
debt and restrict issuance of bonds while outlawing the use of public
authorities as borrowing vehicles.
The
entire analysis is available at www.empirecenter.org/pb/2005/10/breaking_the_bu.php.
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